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Illinois is faced with seemingly insurmountable fiscal problems.Public pensions are still not out of the woods. Bills aren’t gettingpaid on time. The state’s credit rating is in the dungeon. Ideas for
curing the state’s fiscal illness are many, and nearly every one of them
predictably includes the need to raise more money, reduce spending,
or a combination of both. One way to raise more money would be to
“tax waste, not work” by creating a cap-and-trade policy for green-
house gases (GHG). We explore that option here.
A cap-and-trade program has the potential to raise significant revenue
because almost half of the electricity generated in Illinois comes from
coal-fired power plants (see Figure 1). We calculate that permit auc-
tions could raise $1 billion to $4 billion per year, with a reasonable es-
timate of $2 billion in the initial years. Figure 2 shows that this $2
billion would balance the budget in FY2015, and fill almost half of the












1 See the “State of Illinois FY2014 Budget Roadmap,” from the Institute for Illinois’ Fiscal
Sustainability (IIFS), 2013 (available at: http://www.civicfed.org/iifs/publications/Illinois
RoadmapFY2014), or see “Peering Over Illinois’ Fiscal Cliff: New Projections from IGPA’s
Fiscal Futures Model” by Richard Dye, Nancy Hudspeth and David Merriman, The Fiscal
Futures Project, 2013 (available at: http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/Fiscal-Futures-
Projections-Oct-2013.pdf ). 
Source: Authors' calculations based U.S. Energy Information Agency state-level data on electricity
generation by energy source.
Notes: Calculations include generation from independent power producers and electric utilities only.
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Fuel Type by Year
A cap-and-trade policy could position Illinois as a
political and technological leader in the fight
against climate change. Businesses would gain ex-
perience operating under this new framework,
ahead of possible future federal limits on GHG
emissions. And Illinois could develop
patentable technology to be used by
other states or countries that adopt
GHG emission limits.
We begin by reviewing the basic struc-
ture of a cap-and-trade policy, includ-
ing the key permit auctioning protocol
that generates revenue. We use Califor-
nia’s cap-and-trade program, known
as AB-32, as a model, and we base our
revenue projection for Illinois on mim-
icking California’s program. While the
electricity generating companies would
actually pay the state for the carbon emissions, the
true economic burden for such a program would
likely be shifted through higher prices, lower wages,
or lower rates of return. Conventional wisdom
assumes that most of the economic burden of such
a program falls on electric utility customers and on
workers at industries covered by the cap. In con-
trast, we argue that most of the economic incidence
of an Illinois cap-and-trade policy would fall on
out-of-state stockholders of publicly-traded electric
utilities (where 62 percent of relevant annual utility
emissions come from coal-fired power plants
owned by public companies). Therefore, under a
cap-and-trade policy such as the one described
below, Illinois citizens could benefit with higher
state revenue, while people and businesses outside
the state might bear most of the cost through effects
on their corporate stock prices.
Program design and implementation
Implementing a cap-and-trade program is usually
one part of a comprehensive plan to reduce total
GHG emissions. For example, the goal of Califor-
nia’s law AB-32 is to return to 1990 levels of green-
house gas emissions by 2020, and the cap-and-trade
element of AB-32 is integral to achieving that goal.
Let’s examine the basic elements of a cap-and-trade
program that Illinois could implement, using Cali-
fornia’s program as a benchmark, and see how allo-
cating and auctioning permits relates to generating
revenue for the state.
Basic elements
A cap-and-trade program has two
basic elements. First, the “cap” sets a
limit on the total amount of GHG
emissions. Second, the “trade” part of
the program allows for the buying
and selling of permits, where the fixed
number of permits enforces the cap.  
Legislative rules specify which emis-
sion sources are covered by the cap.
For instance, AB-32’s cap covers all
fixed-point smokestack sources that
emit more than 25,000 metric tons of carbon diox-
ide (MTCO2) equivalents annually. The California
law covers approximately 600 fixed-point sources,
such as electric utility power plants.2
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Institute for Illinois Fiscal Sustainability.
Notes: State of Illinois five-year budget projections from IIFS (2013). Potential cap-and-trade
revenue based on $10 per metric ton CO2 permit price for all fixed-point sources with emis-
sions larger than 25,000 metric tons CO2 annually and transportation fuels, totaling $2.0 bil-
lion annually (starting 2015). 
Figure 2
State of Illinois Five-Year Projections: General Funds
Operating Surplus (Deficit) with and without Cap-
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California uses the 25,000 MTCO2 per year thresh-
old because the U.S. EPA already requires fixed-
point sources that emit more to report their
emission under the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Pro-
gram. According to 2011 EPA data, Illinois has 216
fixed-point, industrial plants that emit more than
25,000 MTCO2, where the majority of emissions
come from electric utilities’ power plants.3
In addition, AB-32’s cap covers transportation fuel
distributors. In contrast to industrial sectors, com-
mercial and private-use transportation consists of
mobile emission sources such as trucks and cars.
Since the cost of technology to measure emissions
from the many thousands of mobile sources is pro-
hibitive, the cap instead applies to transportation
fuel directly at the distributor level. 
In order to enforce the cap, the state issues “per-
mits” so that the bearer of one permit is allowed to
emit one metric ton of CO2. Therefore, the number
of permits effectively sets the cap on emissions. In
the first year of a cap-and-trade program, the cap
is set just below the projected business-as-usual
emission level in the absence of the program. The
cap then tightens over time, leading to a widening
difference between actual emissions and business-
as-usual emissions. 
The “trade” part of the cap-and-trade program al-
lows for the buying and selling of permits.4 Supply
and demand determine the market price of a per-
mit. The supply of available permits rises when a
business can forgo emitting carbon dioxide or other
GHGs because they’ve taken steps to reduce emis-
sions – and that’s the point. Abatement could in-
clude: (1) capital improvements that increase fuel
efficiency, (2) switching from high-carbon to low-
carbon fuels, and (3) carbon capture and storage
(CCS) technology such as the FutureGen project
here in Illinois. 
The demand for permits comes from the desire to
emit GHGs that coincide with the production of a
valuable good or service. For example, burning
coal in a power plant generates valuable electricity.
Thus, the market price of a permit is the value of
emitting one unit of carbon dioxide, and it also re-
flects the cost of abating one unit of carbon dioxide.
The market mechanism ensures that businesses un-
dertake low-cost abatement opportunities in order
to sell excess permits. It also means that producers
of high-value commodities and services can con-
tinue to operate, even if abatement is costly, by in-
stead buying permits.
A carbon tax is another market-based mechanism
that can be used to reduce GHG emissions and to
raise revenue. With no uncertainty about either the
supply or the demand for permits, a carbon tax and
cap-and-trade program would yield identical out-
comes. However, when supply and demand are
uncertain, a cap-and-trade program has the advan-
tage of setting an upper-bound on total amount of
GHG emissions.5 Thus, when the cap is tightened
over time, a cap-and-trade program guarantees a
reduction in total GHG emissions. Alternatives to
market-based approaches can also reduce GHG
2 The law refers to MTCO2 “equivalents,” because carbon dioxide is not the only GHG; however, we drop “equivalents” and refer only to GHGs
or CO2 interchangeably. Each greenhouse gas has a different global warming potential (GWP) index that determines how much heat is
trapped per unit of gas during its lifetime in the atmosphere. The six major types of GHGs are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hy-
drofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. The GWP for each gas is relative to the GWP of carbon dioxide. For instance,
the GWP of carbon dioxide is 1, while the GWP for methane is 21 (according to the conversion rate in AB-32).
3 Illinois has a few plants over the emissions threshold in other industrial sectors such as food, chemical, iron and steel, cement, and petroleum.
4 In general, businesses covered by the cap participate actively in the market for permits, but financial services agencies also buy and sell
permits in order to act as brokers and market-makers.
5 In theory, a permit price can fluctuate from very low to very high, depending on economic conditions and the stringency of the cap. In re-
sponse, AB-32 and other cap-and-trade programs institute a lower-bound and upper-bound on the permit price, where the state acts as a
buyer and seller of last resort. The banking and borrowing of permits is another means of reducing price fluctuations.
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emissions. Known as command-and-control (CAC)
regimes, these non-market approaches instead man-
date where and how abatement must be achieved.
Without businesses acting in their own self-interest
to maximize profits, however, CAC regimes have a
difficult time allocating abatement and production
efficiently across many diverse sources. Thus, CAC
regimes are inefficient and lead to a higher social
cost per unit of GHG reduction. Perhaps more im-
portantly, they do not raise revenue.
Auctioning permits and raising revenue
Before trading can occur, permits must be allocated
by the state government to initial recipients. Cap-
and-trade programs generally use two different
methods for allocating permits. The
first “grandfathers” or hands out
valuable permits for free to busi-
nesses in covered industries, where
the number of permits per business
is based on historic GHG emissions
rates and then prorated so that the
total number of grandfathered per-
mits matches the cap. This method
generates no revenue, as the state
gives permits to businesses. Indeed,
polluting businesses effectively re-
ceive a lump-sum payment for
emitting greenhouse gases in the
past. 
The second method is to sell the
permits at an auction conducted by
the state. The revenue from the auc-
tion can be used to bolster the
state’s treasury. California’s AB-32
currently uses a mix of grandfathering and auction
methods, but over time it will shift mainly to auc-
tioned permits. In the first year alone, California
has raised more than $500 million from permit auc-
tions, with a permit price slightly above $10 per
MTCO2.6 Interestingly, although the two methods
have different initial permit allocations, permit
trading can lead to identical production and abate-
ment outcomes for businesses.7 The difference
comes down to whether the state raises revenue
with an auction, or businesses are given valuable
permits for free.
How much revenue could a cap-and-trade program
raise? Assuming that an Illinois program would be
similar to AB-32 and auction all the permits, we ex-
pect such a program to generate approximately $2
billion annually in the initial years. AB-32 requires
a 2 percent annual emissions reduction in the initial
years, and the permit auctions for those years
cleared about $10 per permit. We therefore assume
that Illinois also could achieve 1 percent emissions
reduction for each $5 increment in the permit price:
That is, a $10 per metric ton price would yield a 2
percent reduction, while a $20 per metric ton price
could result in a 4 percent reduc-
tion in GHG emissions. Then the
total revenue is calculated by mul-
tiplying the permit price by the
total emissions under the cap. 
Table 1 presents three different ini-
tial-year estimates of revenue from
a cap-and-trade program in Illinois
under full permit auctioning. We
break the calculation into two
parts: fixed-point and mobile-
source. To begin, we observe that
the 216 industrial plants in Illinois
with annual emissions greater than
25,000 MTCO2 emit about 140 mil-
lion MTCO2 in total per year (using
2011 EPA Greenhouse Gas Report-
ing Program data).8 In the first row
of Table 1, we apply a 1 percent re-
duction to these fixed-point emis-
sions and multiply by $5 per permit, so that
revenue from auctioning permits to cover fixed-
point emissions would be $693 million. Next, we
note that the transportation sector in Illinois emits
about 67 million MTCO2 from mobile-sources an-
nually (using 2010 U.S. Energy Information Agency
(EIA) data).9 Again, applying the 1 percent reduc-
tion to the total mobile-source emissions level and
multiplying by $5 per metric ton permit, we calcu-
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mobile-source emissions would accrue $331 mil-
lion, yielding a total of $1.02 billion. Exact revenue
totals depend on many factors, including: the per-
centage of permits auctioned, the tightness of the
cap, and economic growth in covered industries
under the business-as-usual scenario. 
Scenario 2 in the second row of Table 1 presents the
case with $10 per permit for a 2 percent reduction
in emissions. The permit price is doubled from $5
per metric ton to $10 per metric ton, but the rev-
enue is not quite doubled because the number of
tons falls by 2 percent instead of 1 percent. Scenario
3 has a $20 permit price with a 4 percent emissions
reduction, so revenue is up from $2 billion to $3.97
billion per year.10
As a cap-and-trade program goes on for many
decades, revenue in real terms after accounting for
inflation can rise or fall depending on (1) changes
in the economy toward low-carbon industries, (2)
interactions with other federal or state programs to
reduce GHG emissions, and (3) technological
change (whether induced by the cap-and-trade pro-
gram or unrelated to it). 
Economic incidence and distributional
effects 
A cap-and-trade program puts the statutory bur-
den on producers that emit greenhouse gases and
on distributors of transportation fuels. For exam-
ple, a coal-fired power plant’s operator must pur-
chase a permit for each metric ton of CO2 that the
plant releases from its smokestack. Because of
changes in behavior and changes in prices, how-
ever, other producers or consumers could bear the
6 See http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323734304578541822111512316, or http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
auction/auction.htm. 
7 Fullerton, Don (2001), “A Framework to Compare Environmental Policies,” Southern Economic Journal 68(2): 224–248.
8 Data retrieved from www.ghgdata.epa.gov (from September 2013).
9 Data retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/state_emissions.cfm (from September 2013).
10 The price of $20 per metric ton is approximately the price faced by electricity producers in Europe’s Emission Trading System (EU-ETS) from 2005-
2011. However, prices fell during 2012 and 2013, so as of late 2013 the carbon price in EU-ETS was slightly less than $10 per metric ton. Meanwhile, $5
per metric ton is slightly higher than the permit price in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) cap-and-trade program that covers the north-
ern portion of the United States.
Table 1
Initial Year Estimates of Revenue from a Cap-and-Trade Program in Illinois under Full Permit
Auctioning (2013 dollars)
Permit Price Emissions Fixed-Point Mobile-Source Total
Scenario ($/metric ton) Reduction Revenue Revenue Revenue
(percent) ($ billion) ($ billion) ($ billion)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
1 5 1.0 0.69 0.33 1.02
2 10 2.0 1.37 0.66 2.03
3 20 4.0 2.69 1.29 3.97
Notes: All figures are subject to independent rounding. Assumptions: (a) Baseline fixed-point source emissions are 140 million MTCO2; (b) Baseline mobile-source emissions are
67 million MTCO2; (c) Emission reduction percentages are directly proportional to the permit price, where each $5 of permit price results in a 1.0 percent emission reduction.
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economic burden (or “incidence”).
For instance, while the company
that owns the coal-fired power
plant must buy the permits, it may
be able to pass all of the higher pro-
duction cost to consumers through
higher electricity prices. In that
case, consumers may bear the entire
economic incidence. Since low-in-
come families spend a relatively
large portion of their income on ne-
cessities like electricity, a cap-and-
trade program that leads to higher
electricity prices could have a re-
gressive economic burden. (In con-
trast, the U.S. graduated income tax is a progressive
policy that places a higher proportional burden on
high-income families.)  
Distributional effects of a cap-and-trade program
include higher prices of carbon-intensive products
like electricity, changes in the wage rate at covered
industries, and capitalization of higher costs of pro-
duction into stock prices.11 For reasons explained
below, the last path reflects most of the economic
burden, and thus the cost of the program is shifted
to stockholders of businesses in covered industries,
most of whom live outside Illinois.   
Output prices: Electricity
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that carbon
pricing would raise prices, we expect a cap-and-
trade program in Illinois would not increase local
electricity rates significantly. The reason is that
wholesale markets determine the electricity price
for those customers, using real-time metering, and
those rates depend upon the cost of production at
the last power plant that comes online.12 In Illinois,
the carbon-intensive coal-fired power plants are
used earlier in the dispatch order.13 Instead, the rel-
atively low-carbon natural gas plants are the last
ones to come online and effectively set the price.
Per unit of electricity, natural gas-fired power
plants are approximately 60 percent less carbon-in-
tensive than coal-fired power plants.14 Then a cap-
and-trade program leads to a relatively small cost
increase at natural gas plants that
set the electricity price. However, if
natural gas plants effectively set
the price, just breaking even, then
the market price of electricity may
be too low to cover the higher cost
of producing electricity in carbon-
intensive coal-fired plants. Seven-
teen of the 20 coal-fired power
plants in Illinois with annual emis-
sions above the 25,000 MTCO2
threshold are owned by publicly-
traded companies. Furthermore,
these 17 plants account for 62 per-
cent of annual fixed-point emis-
sions from sources above the reporting threshold
in Illinois. As a consequence, the nationwide stock-
holders of those firms may take a loss.15
Input prices: Labor
Another concern is the potential effect on the wages
and job security of workers in covered industries.
Workers at electric utilities and coal mines often get
mentioned as potential losers, but we show that the
economic burden via this path also is smaller than
what most people may think. Power plants are
long-term investments that are difficult to replace
in the short-run. A cap-and-trade program might
encourage a slightly earlier retirement of coal-fired
power plants, to be replaced by gas-fired power
plants, and workers can gradually move from old
to new generation facilities. For coal miners, the ef-
fects will be small because Illinois power plants
will still demand coal, and power plants in other
states without GHG limits will still demand coal.
However, Illinois could use some of the permit rev-
enue to create a retraining program for displaced
miners (if that specific industry is hit hard by the
cap-and-trade program). 
Capitalization: Stock prices
If higher production costs cannot be passed on to
consumers via higher electricity prices, or to workers
via lower wages, then the result is reduced profits
in the covered industries. Reduced profitability
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traded company’s stock price would probably fall.
Large companies have many stockholders around
the world, and they may have well-paid lobbyists
operating in Illinois, but only a small fraction of
their owners live in Illinois. In terms of magnitude,
for a $10 permit price, the publicly-traded company
that owns the greatest share of coal-fired power
plants in Illinois would incur a 2.5 percent burden
relative to annual revenue.16
An option to consider
Illinois has a significant fiscal crisis, with projec-
tions for multi-billion dollar budget deficits. Yet, a
reasonable cap-and-trade program to reduce green-
house gas emissions could significantly reduce fu-
ture deficits. Specifically, under a program similar
to California’s AB-32, a full auction protocol could
raise $2 billion annually in the initial years of a cap-
and-trade program. Most of the economic burden
of the program would fall on stockholders of the
covered industries, and most of those stockholders
live outside Illinois. In addition, Illinois businesses
could gain experience operating in a GHG-limited
environment ahead of possible future federal lim-
its. Illinois researchers could invent patentable
technologies that other states and countries would
want in their later efforts to reduce GHGs. Imple-
menting a revenue-raising cap-and-trade program
mitigates the need to revoke the sunset provisions
on the income and corporate tax rates or to increase
the state’s sales tax.
Don Fullerton is an economist at the Institute of Gov-
ernment and Public Affairs and a professor of finance
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Daniel H. Karney is a PhD student and graduate re-
search assistant at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.
11 Fullerton, Don (2011), “Six Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy,” Risk Analysis 31(6): 923–929.
12 The wholesale markets are the JPM Interconnect (northeast Illinois) and the Midwest ISO (remainder of the state). For cus-
tomers without real-time metering, the Illinois Power Agency procures electricity for Ameren and ComEd customers and thus
determines a fixed per unit electric price.
13 Nuclear plants have the lowest marginal cost and are first in the order, while coal and gas-fired plants come later in the dis-
patch order. It might be a concern that a cap-and-trade program would change the order so that coal-fired plants would be
the last ones to come online. However, technological constraints make it difficult for coal-fired plants to turn on and off
quickly (i.e. cycle). The plant is either operating all the time or not at all, so it is never just sitting ready to be next in the dis-
patch order. 
14 The U.S EIA estimates that the average coal-fired steam generator has a fuel efficiency rate slightly above 10,000 Btu per kilo-
watt-hour (noting a higher number means lower efficiency). In contrast, it estimates that the average natural gas-fired com-
bined cycle has a fuel efficiency rate of slightly above 7,500 Btu per kilowatt-hour; that is, the gas-fired plant is approximately
25 percent more fuel efficient. In addition, natural gas is just less half as carbon intensive as coal per unit of energy. The U.S.
EIA reports that when combusted natural gas produces 117 pounds of CO2 emitted per million Btu, while coal produces 205.7
to 228.6 pounds of CO2 emitted per million Btu depending on coal type (e.g. bituminous). Multiplying fuel efficiency times
the fuel’s CO2 content yields CO2 per unit of electricity. 
15 If the remaining small electricity price increase is still deemed too onerous, then Illinois can institute a rebate program to as-
sist low-income families in order to mitigate the burden. In addition, the price of gasoline would also increase under a cap-
and-trade program. However, many of the lowest-income families do not own cars, thus mitigating concerns about
regressivity via gasoline prices. Instead, local public transit systems may require a transfer from the state to cover higher fuel
costs.
16 Midwest Generation EME LCC is a subsidiary of Edison International (NYSE:EIX), which has annual revenue of nearly $13 bil-
lion. Their seven coal-fired power plants in Illinois emit approximately 30 million metric tons of CO2 annually, so a $10 per
metric ton price means $300 million dollars, or 2.5 percent of revenue. Other smaller companies may incur higher burdens as
a share of revenue. 
